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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 24Abstract: We show that, when private sector expectations are determined in 
line with adaptive learning, optimal policy responds persistently to cost-push 
shocks. The optimal response is stronger and more persistent, the higher is the 
initial level of perceived inflation persistence by the private sector. Such a 
sophisticated policy reduces inflation persistence and inflation volatility at little 
cost in terms of output gap volatility. Persistent responses to cost-push shocks 
and stability of inflation expectations resemble optimal policy under 
commitment and rational expectations. Nevertheless, it is clear that the 
mechanism at play is very different. In the case of commitment it relies on 
expectations of future policy actions affecting inflation expectations; in the 
case of sophisticated central banking it relies on the reduction in the estimated 
inflation persistence parameter based on inflation data generated by shocks and 
policy responses. 
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Non-technical abstract 
Inflation dynamics crucially depends on how inflation expectations are 
formed. In most modern macroeconomics, expectations are modeled in 
accordance with rational or model-consistent expectations. Over the last thirty 
years, researchers have systematically explored the implications of rational 
expectations for the conduct of monetary policy. However, rational 
expectations assume economic agents who are extremely knowledgeable. An 
alternative approach is to assume adaptive learning. Under this assumption 
agents have only limited knowledge of the structure of the economy. They run 
reduced-form regressions and, as time goes by and available data changes, they 
change their forecasting rule. Thus, the alternative can be understood as 
implying bounded rationality. Adaptive learning, as a minimal departure from 
rational expectations, provides a plausible framework for modeling the 
behavior of economic agents who are coping with continuous economic 
change. Moreover, adaptive learning seems to provide an empirically 
reasonable way to model the formation of the private sector’s inflation 
expectations. 
This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy in an economy where 
inflation expectations are formed through adaptive learning. We assume that 
the central bank has full information about the structure of the economy (this is 
standard under rational expectations), including knowledge about the precise 
mechanism generating private sector expectations. Because a similar 
assumption is also implicit in the rational expectations literature, it should 
provide a useful benchmark for comparing optimal monetary policy under 
adaptive learning and rational expectations.  
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The paper shows that, when private sector expectations are formed in line 
with adaptive learning, optimal policy responds in a persistent way to cost-push 
shocks. Through its persistent response to shocks - coupled with optimal 
response to state variables – the central bank reduces inflation persistence and 
inflation volatility at little cost in terms of output gap volatility. Persistent 
response to cost-push shocks and stability of inflation expectations resemble 
optimal policy under commitment and rational expectations. Nevertheless, it is 
clear that the mechanism at play is very different. In the case of commitment it 
relies on expectations of future policy actions affecting inflation expectations. 
Specifically, in the event of a positive cost-push shock, optimal policy under 
commitment creates an output gap that persists long after the transitory shock 
has faded away. The intuition is that, by doing so, optimal policy lowers price 
expectations moderating the current increases in prices; thus the impact of the 
original shock is spread out over time. In the case of adaptive learning, the 
mechanism at play is based on the reduction in the estimated inflation 
persistence parameter based on data generated by shocks and policy responses. 
By creating a track record of stable inflation, the central bank anchors inflation 
expectations, thereby reinforcing its ability to maintain stability. Finally, for 
research on inflation persistence an important finding is that inflation is time-
varying even if the inflation target remains unchanged. Thus, adaptive learning 
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1.  Introduction 
Inflation dynamics crucially depends on how inflation expectations are 
formed. In most modern macroeconomics, expectations are modeled in 
accordance with rational expectations. Over the last thirty years, researchers 
have systematically explored the implications of rational expectations for the 
conduct of policy. However, rational expectations (paraphrasing Evans and 
Honkapohja 2001) assume economic agents who are extremely knowledgeable. 
An alternative approach is to limit their knowledge so that, as time goes by and 
available data changes, so does the agents’ forecasting rule. Thus, the 
alternative can be understood as implying bounded rationality. In fact, it 
implies limiting agents’ knowledge about the true structure of the model. 
Adaptive learning, as a minimal departure from rational expectations (see 
Evans and Honkapohja 2001 and also Orphanides and Williams 2005), 
provides a plausible framework for modeling the behavior of economic agents 
who are coping with accelerating economic change. Moreover, adaptive 
learning seems to provide an empirically reasonable way to model the 
formation of the private sector’s expectations (see Orphanides and Williams 
2004). 
Orphanides and Williams (2005) have shown that adaptive learning matters 
for the conduct of monetary policy. They show for the case of linear feedback 
rules that strengthening the policy response to inflation helps to limit the 
increase in perceived inflation persistence. Thus, a strategy of tight inflation 
control may reduce both inflation and output gap volatility. Svensson (2003) 
argues that simple instrument rules fail to capture how central banks actually 
conduct policy. If adaptive learning is (empirically) a good description of 
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expectations formation, then it is important to characterize optimal monetary 
policy in such a setting
1.  
Modeling the optimal behavior of policy makers requires specifying their 
information set. As in Gaspar et al. (2005b), here we consider the (admittedly) 
extreme case of sophisticated central banking. Specifically, we assume that the 
central bank has full information about the structure of the economy (this is 
standard under rational expectations). In our context, this implies that the 
information set includes knowledge about the precise mechanism generating 
private sector expectations. Because a similar assumption is also implicit in the 
rational expectations literature, it should provide a useful benchmark for 
comparing optimal monetary policy under adaptive learning and rational 
expectations.  
In this paper, we focus on the implications of sophisticated central banking 
for inflation persistence. Adaptive learning implies that inflation dynamics will 
be affected by the history of shocks driving the economy. For research on 
inflation persistence this means that inflation is time varying even if the 
inflation target remains unchanged. Thus, adaptive learning is relevant when 
interpreting empirical estimates of inflation persistence. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
model, its calibration, and the simulation method. Section 3 presents the results 
and Section 4 concludes.  
 
                                                 
1 For example, in Gaspar et al. (2005a) we argue that persistent inflation expectations, like those 
generated by adaptive learning, help to explain the dynamics of monetary policy regime change 
associated with the Volcker disinflation (starting in October 1979). 
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2. The Model, Calibration, and the Simulation Method  
 
2.1. A New Keynesian model of inflation dynamics and monetary policy 
Our primary interest here is inflation persistence. Therefore, we want a 
model where there is intrinsic inflation persistence under rational expectations 
and interaction of persistence with private sector learning. Toward this end, we 
choose a simple extension of the benchmark New Keynesian model in 
Woodford (2003). A finite elasticity of substitution between goods, θ, leads to 
monopolistically competitive producers who set prices that are sticky (in the 
Calvo sense) such that only a fraction 1-α of firms set prices optimally in each 
period. Furthermore, firms - which are not “drawn” to optimally update their 
prices - instead partially index their prices at a rate γ to lagged inflation (along 
the lines of, e.g., Smets and Wouters 2003). Finally, we assume the existence 
of temporary cost-push shocks that generate a trade-off for monetary policy, 
which can be formally motivated by a stochastic intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution between goods or, alternatively, by stochastic taxes. 
Woodford (2003) shows that under rational expectations these assumptions 
lead to a Phillips curve of the form 
() , 1 1 t t t t t t t u x + + − Ε = − + − κ γπ π β γπ π               (1)  
where π is inflation, x is the output gap, β is the discount rate,  u is a cost-push 
shock (assumed i.i.d.), and κ is a function of the structural parameters including 
the degree of Calvo price stickiness. Furthermore, up to a second-order 








1 t t t t x L λ γπ π + − = −            (2) 
where λ=κ/θ measures the relative weight on output gap stabilization. We will 
assume here that the central bank uses the social welfare function to guide its 
policy decisions, both under rational expectations and under private sector 
learning.
2 If γ≠1 then the optimal rate of inflation is zero (otherwise there will 
be inefficient dispersion of prices in the steady state) and we therefore assume 
that the known inflation target (coinciding with the average level of inflation in 
the absence of an overambitious output gap target) equals this level. To keep 
the model simple, we assume that the central bank controls the output gap 
directly.   
2.2. The formation of inflation expectations 
We consider two assumptions regarding the formation of inflation 
expectations in equation (1): rational expectations and recursive least-squares 
learning. 
The standard assumption in the literature is to assume rational expectations. 
In this case, the private sector knows the structure of the economy as shown in 
(1) as well as the monetary policy reaction function implied by the central 
bank’s loss function (2). In this case, it turns out that optimal monetary policy 
under discretion responds to the exogenous shock but not to lagged inflation (in 
contrast to when the loss function consists of squared inflation and output; see 
Clarida, et al. 1999). Optimal discretionary policy is described by 




− =               (3) 
                                                 
2 It is clear that it matters at which stage of the analysis learning is introduced. In this paper, we follow 
the convention in the adaptive learning literature and assume that the structural relations (besides the 
expectations operator) remain identical when moving from rational expectations to adaptive learning. 
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Under the optimal discretionary policy, the output gap responds only to the 
current cost-push shock. In particular, following a positive cost-push shock to 
inflation, monetary policy is tightened and the output gap falls. The strength of 
the response depends on the slope of the New Keynesian Phillips curve and the 
weight on output gap stabilization in the loss function. In contrast, if the central 
bank is able to credibly commit to future policy actions, then optimal policy 
will feature a persistent “history dependent” response as discussed extensively 
in Woodford (2003). The relevant mechanism relies on the fact that credible 
promises of future policy actions help stabilize current inflation through 
expectations. 
Under rational expectations and discretionary monetary policy, the only 
endogenous state variable is lagged inflation and hence the equilibrium 
dynamics of inflation will follow a first-order autoregressive process, where it 
turns out that the coefficient on lagged inflation equal the degree of indexation: 
 . ~
1 t t t u + = − γπ π        (4) 
The alternative expectation formation we consider is adaptive learning. 
Specifically, we assume that the private sector believes the inflation process is 
well approximated by equation (4). They estimate the equation recursively on 
the basis of a “constant gain” least-squares algorithm implying perpetual 
learning.  
Thus, the agents estimate the following reduced-form equation for 
inflation:
3 
                                                 
3  Even if each agent knows its own γ , it makes sense for the agent to estimate the autoregressive 
parameter if  they do not know other agents’ γ , nor the central banks policy reaction function or how 
their own inflation expectations are transmitted to the economy.   
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 . 1 t t t t c ε π π + = −             (5) 
Agents are bounded rational because they do not take into account the fact 
that ct varies over time. Furthermore, ct captures the estimated (or perceived) 
inflation persistence.
4 
The following equations describe the recursive updating of the parameters 
estimated by the private sector: 
), ( 1 1 1
1
1 − − −
−
− − + = t t t t t t t c gR c c π π π                       (6) 
), ( 1
2
1 1 − − − − + = t t t t R g R R π                    (7) 
where g is the constant gain. Note that because of the learning dynamics the 
number of state variables are expanded to four, (ut , πt-1, Rt,  ct-1)., all known by 
the central bank when they set policy at time t.  
A further consideration with regard to the updating process is the 
information used by the private sector when updating its estimates and forming 
its forecast for the next period’s inflation. We assume that agents use current 
inflation when they forecast future inflation (discussed further below) but not 
in updating the parameters. This implies that expected inflation may be written 
simply as: 
. 1 1 t t t t c π π − + = Ε                 (8) 
Generally, there is a simultaneity problem in forward-looking models when 
combined with learning. In (1), current inflation is determined in part by future 
expected inflation; but according to (8), expected future inflation is not 
determined until current inflation is determined. Moreover, in the general case 
                                                 
4  We assume that the private sector knows the inflation target (equal to zero). In future research, we 
intend to explore the implications of learning about the inflation target. 
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also the estimated parameter c will depend on current inflation if current 
inflation is used to update the parameter currently used. The literature has taken 
(at least) three approaches to this problem. The first is to lag the information set 
so that agents use only t-1 inflation when forecasting πt+1, which was the 
assumption used in Gaspar and Smets (2002). A different and more common 
route is to look for the fixed point that reconciles both the forecast and actual 
inflation, but to disallow agents from updating the coefficients using current 
information. This has the benefit of keeping the deviation from the standard 
model as small as possible (also the rational expectations equilibrium changes 
if one lags the information set) while keeping the fixed-point problem 
relatively simple. At an intuitive level, it can also be justified by the 
assumption that it takes more time to re-estimate a forecasting model than to 
apply an existing model. Finally, a third approach is to also let the coefficients 
be updated with current information. This results in a more complicated fixed-
point problem.
5  
Substituting equation (8) into (1) gives: 















π                  (9) 
  
2.3. Calibration of the model 
We are now ready to study the dynamics of inflation, but before doing so 
we must make specific assumptions about key parameters. In the simulations 
we use the following set of structural parameters as a benchmark: γ=0.5, 
                                                 
5  It is possible to solve this problem in the current setting. However, we leave this for future research. 
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β=0.99,  θ=10, and α=0.66. Coupled with additional assumptions on the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption and the elasticity of 
labor supply (see the discussion in Woodford 2003) these structural parameters 
imply that κ=0.019 and λ= 0.002. We choose γ such that there is some inflation 
persistence in the benchmark calibration; γ at about 0.5 is a value frequently 
found in empirically estimated new Keynesian Phillips curves (see e.g. Smets 
2003). Our choice of θ=10 corresponds to a markup of about 10%. 
Furthermore,  α is chosen such that the average duration of prices is three 
quarters, which is consistent with U.S. evidence. The constant gain, g, is 
calibrated at 0.03. Orphanides and Williams (2004) found that a value in the 
range 0.01 to 0.04 is needed to match up the resulting model-based inflation 
expectations with the Survey of Professional Forecasters. A value of 0.03 
corresponds to an average sample length of about 17 quarters.
6 In the limiting 
case, when the gain approaches zero, the influence of policy on the estimated 
inflation persistence goes to zero and hence plays no role in the policy problem. 
Finally, the standard deviation of the shock, ut, is set to 0.004. 
2.4. Monetary policy and private sector learning 
In the context of adaptive learning, we distinguish two alternative 
assumptions regarding the conduct of monetary policy: a simple rule and 
“sophisticated” monetary policy. Under the simple rule, the central bank 
conducts policy according to the same reaction function as under rational 
expectations (under discretion) characterized by (3). This rule, together with 
the Phillips curve (1) and the system of equations (6)-(8) determining private 
                                                 
6 See Orphanides and Williams (2004). Similarly, Milani (2005) estimates the gain parameter to be 
0.03 using a Bayesian estimation methodology 
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sector inflation expectations, uniquely pins down the dynamics of the system. 
Under the simple rule, if inflation persistence is high then the dynamics of 
inflation may even become explosive. For such a case the simulation process 
breaks down. In order to rule this out, we follow Orphanides and Williams 
(2004) and implement a cutoff point that stops the updating when the estimated 
persistence parameter exceeds 1. Then we simply assume that the private sector 
continues to use the unit root process until some shock drives the estimate 
down. 
Sophisticated central banking, in contrast, implies solving the full dynamic 
optimization problem, where the parameters associated with the estimation 
process are also state variables. We emphasize that our use of the term 
“sophisticated” is not to imply that the simple rule is unsophisticated. It is, of 
course, possible to solve the “sophisticated” problem only by assuming (as we 
do) that the central bank has full information about how the private sector 
forms expectations - a stark contrast to what other authors assume about the 
state of the central banks knowledge. We are quite sympathetic to these 
alternative assumptions but still think it is interesting to consider what the 
central bank would do if indeed it were endowed with full information. 
Specifically, in this case the central bank solves the following dynamic 
programming problem: 
() ), ( min ) ( , 1 , , 1
2 2
1 , , 1 , 1 , t t t t t t t t
x
t t t t c R u V x R c u V
t
+ + − − − Ε + + − = π β λ γπ π π       (10) 
 subject to the expectations-adjusted Phillips curve (1) and, again, the equations 
determining private sector expectations (6)-(8).   
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We resort to nonlinear methods in order to solve the policy problem. We 
employ the collocation methods described in Judd (1998) and Miranda and 
Fackler (2002); the value function is approximated by a combination of cubic 
splines, which translates the problem to a root-finding exercise (for details see 
Gaspar et al.  2005b). 
 
3.  Results 
 
Table 1 compares for our benchmark calibration the variance and 
autocorrelation of output and the quasi-difference of inflation in four cases: 
optimal commitment and discretionary policy under rational expectations and 
optimal policy (sophisticated central banking) and a simple rule under adaptive 
learning. Note that the simple policy rule is exactly the same as the rule under 
discretion (equation (3)). The table also shows the expected welfare loss as a 
proportion of the welfare loss under commitment. 
 
  TABLE 1: Summary of results. 
 
      Notes: Var(xt), Var(πt −γπτ−1) and E[Lt] are measured as ratios relative to commitment. 
Rational Expectations Adaptive  Learning 
 
Commitment Discretion Sophisticated Simple  Rule 
Corr(xt, xt-1)  0.65 0 0.54  0 
Corr(πt, πt-1)  0.24 0.50 0.34  0.60 
Var(xt)  1 0.95  1.01  0.95 
Var(πt −γπτ−1)  1 1.37  1.10  1.55 
E[Lt]  1 1.28  1.08  1.43 
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Starting with the comparison between commitment and discretion under 
rational expectations, it is well known (see Clarida et al. 1999 and Woodford 
2003) that commitment implies a persistent response to cost-push shocks 
lasting well after the shock has vanished from the economy. The intuition is 
that the optimal policy under commitment – by generating expectations of a 
price-level reduction in the face of a positive cost-push shock - reduces the 
immediate impact of the shock, spreading it over time. Table 1 shows that the 
output gap is persistent under commitment, yet not so under the simple rule 
(assuming i.i.d cost-push shocks). In contrast, inflation is much more persistent 
under discretion (0.5 against 0.24). The variance of the quasi-difference of 
inflation is about 37% higher under discretion while output gap volatility is 
only about 5% lower (illustrating the stabilization bias under discretion). As a 
result, the expected loss is about 28% higher under discretion. 
A comparison of the outcomes under rational expectations and adaptive 
learning with the same simple policy rule (columns 2 and 4 of Table 1) 
confirms the findings of Orphanides and Williams (2004). While the 
autocorrelation of the output gap remains unchanged at zero, the 
autocorrelation of inflation increases from 0.5 to about 0.6 under adaptive 
learning. As a result, the variance of the quasi-difference of inflation and the 
expected welfare loss increase sharply. The intuition for the increase in the 
variance of the quasi-difference of inflation is that a higher average perceived 
inflation persistence increases the impact of cost-push shocks on current 
inflation through inflation expectations.  
17
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Finally, optimal policy under adaptive learning allows for sharp reductions 
in inflation persistence and volatility relative to the simple rule. The variance of 
the quasi-difference of inflation declines from about 55% above the 
commitment case to only about 10%.  At the same time, the variance of the 
output gap increases but only a little over 6%, compared with the simple rule 
and about 1% compared with the commitment case.    In terms of expected 
loss, optimal policy allows for a reduction from about 43% above commitment 
to about 8% above.  
Overall, sophisticated central banking under adaptive learning shares some 
features of optimal policy under commitment and rational expectations. In both 
cases, persistent responses to cost-push shocks induce a significant positive 
autocorrelation in the output gap, leading to lower inflation persistence through 
stable inflation expectations. Nevertheless, the mechanism under adaptive 
learning is clearly different, since commitment to future policy actions plays no 
role. Specifically, sophisticated central banking relies on its ability to influence 
estimated inflation persistence. This becomes clear from Figure 1, which plots 
the mean dynamic response of inflation, the output gap and the perceived 
inflation persistence to a cost push shock of 1-standard deviation for various 
initial levels (0.3, 0.5 and 0.7) of the estimated persistence parameter c.  
A few observations are worth making. First, the higher the initial inflation 
persistence estimated by the private sector, the larger the response of a 
sophisticated central bank to a given cost-push shock. The intuition for this is 
straightforward: a given cost-push shock will have a larger effect on current 
inflation through its effect on inflation expectations when agents perceive the 
18
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persistence of such shocks to be higher. As the central bank is trading off 
inflation and output gap volatility, it will respond by tightening monetary 
policy more. Second, the higher the initial perceived inflation persistence, the 
more persistent the output gap response to a cost-push shock. Such a policy 
succeeds at reducing the estimated degree of inflation persistence quite quickly. 
Third, on average the estimated inflation persistence falls below its non-
stochastic steady state. Over time, the perceived inflation persistence falls to a 
level close to 0.3 rather than 0.5.  
 
4.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we show that, when private sector expectations are formed in 
line with adaptive learning, optimal policy responds in a persistent way to cost-
push shocks. Through its persistent response to shocks - coupled with optimal 
response to state variables - sophisticated central banking reduces inflation 
persistence and inflation volatility at little cost in terms of output gap volatility.  
Persistent response to cost-push shocks and stability of inflation 
expectations resemble optimal policy under commitment and rational 
expectations. Nevertheless, it is clear that the mechanism at play is very 
different. In the case of commitment it relies on expectations of future policy 
actions affecting inflation expectations. Specifically, in the event of a positive 
cost-push shock, optimal policy under commitment creates an output gap that 
persists long after the transitory shock has faded away. The intuition is that, by 
doing so, optimal policy lowers price expectations moderating the current 
increases in prices; thus the impact of the original shock is spread out over 
19
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time. In the case of sophisticated central banking the mechanism at play is 
based on the reduction in the estimated inflation persistence parameter based 
on data generated by shocks and policy responses. By creating a track record of 
stable inflation, the central bank anchors inflation expectations, thereby 
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Figure 1. Mean dynamic responses to a 1-S.D. cost-push shock for different levels 
of perceived inflation persistence (c). 
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